been a cornerstone of European security. The transparency and confidence-building accomplished through the other European security instruments are necessary, but not sufficient to prevent conflict in Europe over the long term. Therefore, the United States should pursue negotiation of a conventional arms limitation treaty to replace CFE. The treaty's central purpose should be to reestablish meaningful limits on conventional armed forces in Europe, in order to provide a high degree of certainty among neighbors and the wider European community that conventional force levels will not see a return to the unstable levels that existed prior to CFE. Concluding a new conventional limitations treaty will further U.S. interests by: (1) decreasing the likelihood of a conventional arms race in Europe; (2) contributing to stabilization and eventual resolution of enduring or 'frozen' conflicts; (3) establishing more favorable conditions for the advancement of U.S. nuclear disarmament goals, and; (4) setting conditions for the further promotion of arms control initiatives outside of Europe.
Building without a Cornerstone: The Indispensable Role of CFE in the European Security Structure
We must not count with certainty on a continuance of our present prosperity during such an interval; but unquestionably there never was a time in the history of this country when, from the situation of Europe, we might more reasonably expect fifteen years of peace, than we may at the present moment.
- The limits established in CFE undergird the rest of the European security structure. The transparency and confidence-building accomplished through the other European security instruments are necessary, but not sufficient to prevent conflict in Europe over the long term. Therefore, the United States should pursue negotiation of a conventional arms limitation treaty to replace CFE. The treaty's central purpose should be to reestablish meaningful limits on conventional armed forces in Europe, in order to provide a high degree of certainty among neighbors and the wider European community that conventional force levels will not see a return to the unstable levels that existed prior to CFE.
Concluding a new conventional limitations treaty will further U.S. interests by: (1)
decreasing the likelihood of a conventional arms race in Europe; (2) contributing to stabilization and eventual resolution of enduring or 'frozen' conflicts; (3) establishing more favorable conditions for the advancement of U.S. nuclear disarmament goals, and; (4) setting conditions for the further promotion of arms control initiatives outside of Europe.
These objectives will drive determination of the treaty specifics, such as equipment limits, equipment categories, content of data exchanges, and inspection provisions. Arms control is not an end in itself; it is a way to enhance and improve the security environment. Whatever form the treaty ultimately takes, one thing that is certain is that it must be verifiable. As was the case with CFE, the treaty will advantageously provide meaningful information on conventional forces, which will enhance transparency and build confidence among treaty partners. However, the primary purpose of the treaty will be to establish a new set of limits.
This new treaty will be only one component of a regime of mutually supporting agreements; therefore, it cannot be negotiated in a vacuum. An analysis of the quality and quantity of the information, degree of transparency, and confidence-building measures currently provided by other elements of the European security regime, such as the Vienna Document, Open Skies Treaty, and Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI) should inform development of specific provisions in the new treaty.
The information and verification elements of the treaty should fill the gaps in information and transparency that these other agreements provide in order to complement, rather than duplicate, existing instruments.
History and Current Status of CFE
Following the unsuccessful Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks, which began in 1973 and stalled in 1979, the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact agreed 3 to a mandate to negotiate the CFE Treaty in 1989. 4 Twenty-two countries signed the treaty in November 1990, and it entered into force in July 1992. 5 Although it became the cornerstone of European security, the CFE Treaty was neither the first, nor is it the only arms control agreement in Europe.
The treaty's original purpose was to establish a stable balance of conventional forces in Europe by achieving parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It achieved parity by establishing for each alliance equal bloc limits in the five categories of equipment limited by the treaty. 6 CFE increased stability by establishing a system of zonal sub-limits that restricted the amount of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) that each bloc could station near the inter-bloc border, thus reducing the capacity of each side to launch a surprise attack. 7 The treaty has been remarkably successful in fulfilling its mandate of establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe while eliminating the capability to launch a surprise attack or initiate large-scale offensive action in Europe. 8 Since 1992, the States Parties have destroyed more than 69,000 pieces of conventional armaments and equipment subject to the treaty, and conducted more than 5,500 on-site inspections. The GEMI is an information exchange conducted among OSCE countries. It provides data on military command structure, number of personnel assigned to the conventional armed forces, and information on major weapon and equipment systems.
Personnel numbers are disaggregated by rank and assigned command. Equipment 7 numbers are reported by category and geographic location. The information provided is not subject to limitations, constraints, or verification. 16 This extremely brief exposition on the other main elements of the European arms control regime is intended to illustrate the point that while these agreements provide significant transparency in their current forms, and in the case of the Vienna Document, an array of mechanisms to increase interactions between militaries and build trust and confidence among the participating States, in practical terms, they do not limit or constrain military capability. While these agreements provide a considerable level of transparency regarding military forces, they do not provide anywhere near the fidelity of information required by CFE, nor do they allow the level of intrusiveness through on-theground inspections that CFE affords. 
Limits Provide Predictability for Defense Planning
Legal constraints on conventional forces provide an unmatched level of certainty regarding the probable future force levels of one's neighbors, which aids in defense planning. No treaty can absolutely guarantee that a country will not engage in a future build-up of its forces. However, a limitations treaty establishes a norm, to which a country explicitly agrees by signing the treaty. A later violation of the limit signals a hostile intention far more clearly than an identical force increase in the absence of the limit. This is true for two reasons: it requires a conscious internal government decision to violate the previously agreed-to limit, and the act itself provides an unambiguous external demonstration of a change in the security environment. Intentions in the absence of a legal limitation would be more ambiguous and difficult to determine.
Legally-binding limits, coupled with transparency, provide a degree of certainty about the future that allows defense planning to occur in a more certain and predictable fashion. If a country knows its neighbors are legally constrained and can verify they are complying with their obligations, it can optimize its defense budget and force structure to meet its security needs. Limits reduce the need for excess capacity to hedge against an uncertain future, thereby reducing the likelihood of ever-escalating force levels.
Preservation of legal limits will allow the downward trend of conventional holdings to continue, or at a minimum, ensure that they do not increase. 
Limits Will Assure Russia
By the same token, limits will reduce the military requirements of Russia and other non-Alliance countries by constraining NATO. It is fair to ask how constraining NATO is in the interest of the U.S. Part of the answer is that reciprocity is a fundamental tenet of arms control. If the U.S. and NATO desire constraints upon the capabilities of others, they have to expect the same in return. This is not to say that NATO or the U.S. should be constrained to the point of military impotence.
Russia perceives a significant conventional force imbalance between itself and NATO. With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to NATO, the Russian General
Staff calculated a NATO advantage of 2200 battle tanks, 3300 armored combat vehicles, and 2000 artillery pieces. 23 The Baltics are another area of concern for Russia. They are outside CFE, and there is significant anxiety in Russia that NATO could station a large number of forces there because those countries are not subject to numerical limits. The only way to truly achieve the goal of creating a Europe that is whole, free, and democratic is by treating Russia less as an adversary and more as a partner. Of course, this requires Russia to do the same. Conventional arms limitations cannot achieve this goal, but they are key to setting the conditions by changing Russian threat perceptions of NATO.
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Many Russian thinkers and politicians continue to view NATO-and the continuing possibility of its further eastward expansion-as a threat to Russian security. Critics could argue that CFE and ACFE already establish parity between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and they would be correct. 29 They would also be correct in asserting that if one includes all of the "unaccounted" or "uncontrolled" treaty-limited equipment 15 present in Nagorno-Karabakh, that both countries are exceeding their treaty limits. 30 However, the solution is not to abandon arms control. As argued above, limits can serve as a barometer for conflict. A violation of previously agreed limits provides unambiguous warning that the security situation has deteriorated. Perhaps more important, the inspections conducted under the CFE Treaty achieve transparency and reduce tensions. 31 Negotiation and conclusion of a replacement CFE Treaty can assist with resolution of the frozen conflicts by bringing the effected countries to the table, re-base lining their equipment limits, and reinvigorating information exchange and inspection activities. However, this would only address the interstate component of these conflicts, which is necessary but not sufficient. The national governments could address the intrastate dimensions by concluding sub-regional arms control agreements with the separatist movements modeled on Article IV of the Dayton Accords. 32 Whatever solutions are devised, it is important to note that they cannot be accomplished without Russian cooperation; they support entities involved in all of the frozen conflicts. 33 Furthering U.S. Nuclear Disarmament Objectives A conventional arms limitation treaty would help further U.S. nuclear disarmament objectives. The U.S. has a stated objective of reducing tactical nuclear weapons in the next round of nuclear reduction talks. 34 However, this is at odds with Russia's current defense strategy, which places an increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons because of a perceived NATO conventional superiority. 35 Based on the Russian defense strategy, further progress on nuclear arms reductions, especially tactical nuclear weapons, is unlikely without legally-binding limits and/or significant further reductions to NATO conventional force levels. In a Europe without CFE, Moscow, and perhaps some NATO countries, will see tactical nuclear weapons as a counterweight to conventional imbalances. followed by negotiations to further adapt the treaty. 41 From a U.S. standpoint, this is not a viable approach. One cannot begin to imagine the Senate giving consent to ratification of a treaty that requires immediate renegotiation upon entry into force.
The new treaty should retain the ACFE structure of national and territorial
ceilings, but most countries should agree to reduce the ceilings set in ACFE so they are closer to current holdings. Although ACFE purposely moved away from the bloc limits of the original treaty, a collective ceiling for NATO countries may be worth considering, given Russia's continued anxiety about the potential for future NATO enlargement.
On-site inspection provisions should remain largely unchanged. Information To start the process, Russia must be convinced that the U.S. interests identified here: preventing an arms race, resolving the frozen conflicts, nuclear disarmament, and promotion of arms control outside Europe, are also Russian interests, and that a new treaty can further those interests. This is the realm of diplomats, and can be accomplished through U.S. -Russia bilateral consultations and the NATO Russia
Council.
However, identifying common interests is just the beginning. For a negotiation to succeed, Russia must perceive that there is something to be gained by signing a new treaty. The art in arms control is convincing the other side that you have conceded something in negotiations, when in fact, you were willing to give up all along. The U.S.
and NATO must determine what they can 'give up' in order to conclude a new treaty.
NATO should make clear at the outset that all member countries will be party to the treaty and subject to its limits. All members of the OSCE should be invited to participate in negotiations and join the treaty. This will address Russian concerns regarding NATO countries that are not currently subject to CFE equipment limits.
NATO countries should telegraph early in the process that they are willing to accept equipment ceilings that are significantly lower than ACFE limits. Romania may be a way to address the flank issue and convince Russia to agree to new flank limits on its territory. Lower ceilings are also a way to reduce Russia's reliance on tactical nuclear weapons as part of its defense strategy.
While it may seem like a step backward because ACFE eliminates the bloc limits of the original CFE treaty, a NATO bloc limit may merit consideration. As noted above, Russia views NATO's eastward expansion as a threat to its security. Establishing overall equipment ceilings that NATO cannot exceed could be a way to mitigate this perceived threat. If a new country joined NATO, but in doing so caused the Alliance to exceed its bloc TLE limit, reductions in that country and/or other NATO members would be required to bring equipment levels below the ceiling.
It may also be necessary to reconsider the long-standing position on Russia's Istanbul commitments involving Georgia and Moldova. A compromise approach might involve negotiation of equipment limits within the CFE process, and parallel negotiations under Chapter 10 of the Vienna Document to resolve the political aspects of these frozen conflicts.
These are just some of the ways available to at least begin the process of concluding a new treaty to replace CFE. Additional 'trade space' will reveal itself in the course of negotiations.
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The means required are fairly modest. Over 20 years of CFE data, combined with information gained through the Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty, make the assessment of the military capabilities of the various countries involved in the negotiation a much easier task than it was in 1990. As a result, the commitment of significant intelligence resources to support negotiations will not be necessary. It will involve a sustained and concerted diplomatic effort backed by interagency support and deliberations in Washington and other capitals. 
